美国知名智库外交关系协会（Foreign Relations Association）的特别报告，肯定总统川普的对华政策。 6park.com
报告认为，川普的对华政策扭转了过去20年（3届美国政府）——从克林顿、小布什到奥巴马政府对北京战略意图的误读。而在给北京施加经济压力、要其改变（不公）贸易做法上，川普做得比他的任何一个前任都要多。

　　报告作者是外交关系协会美国外交政策资深研究员罗伯特·布莱克维尔 （Robert Blackwill）。他也是约翰·霍普金斯大学国际研究院亨利·基辛格全球事务中心的高级研究员。
　　反思美对华政策 70年来最大外交政策失误
　　报告说，鉴于中国（中共）对世界秩序以及对美国和盟友逐渐累积的危险战略后果，过去几届美国政府的对华战略误读，是“自第二次世界大战以来，对美国外交政策损害最大的三大错误之一”。
　　相比1965年越战升级和2003年派兵进入伊拉克，报告认为，美国对华政策的长期误读可能是过去70年来最大的外交政策失误。
　　在这份评估川普政府众多外交政策的报告中，对华政策被置于最前面。
　　报告认为，如果华盛顿与亚洲盟国对北京的激进政策早提出质疑，那么中共会比现在更弱，或许这会让各方在主要的合作领域建立并保持一个粗平衡。
　　但在美国一味误判中共、直至最终惊觉后，面对中共领导层继续推进其战略意图、继续走对抗路线的现状，美国就必须要有更强硬的回应才行。

　　报告说，川普政府唤醒了美国，需要直面中国（中共）对美国国家利益和民主价值构成的越来越大的威胁。
　　“在北京果断地将大部分亚洲国家纳入其轨道并远离美国的时候，如果没有川普政府对中国（中共）实力日益增长的危险进行持续的政治推动，美国可能还在继续梦游中。”报告写道。
　　“值得肯定的是，川普政府此后对中国（中共）采取了一种更清晰的政策，跟过去的很多错误（政策）都不同。”报告说，“川普已经巧妙地向中国（中共）施压、并取得成功。”
　　根据政策产生的国家利益影响 给出客观评估
　　外交关系协会会长瑞查德·哈斯（Richard Hass）在报告的前言部分的致辞中说，报告系“根据川普政府的政策对美国国家利益所产生的影响”进行的评估，而不是根据川普政府的对外言辞来判断。
　　报告列举川普政府的政策行动包括：2017年12月，川普政府的首份《国家安全战略》，强调“中国（中共）正利用经济诱惑和惩罚手段，影响力运作和威胁使用武力以说服其它国家重视其政治和经济议程”。
　　2018年1月，川普政府发布《国家国防战略》，定位“中国（中共）是一个战略竞争对手，利用掠夺性经济恐吓邻国，同时在南海搞军事化”。
　　2018年10月4日，副总统麦克·彭斯（Mike Pence）发表对华政策演讲，这是美国政府在美中关系50年来发表的“最严厉的演讲”。
　　2019年2月11日，川普总统签署《美国人工智能计划》的行政令。
　　对华贸易战 巧妙施压成功
　　对川普政府的对华贸易战，报告说，川普“公开、大声对抗北京及其长期的不公贸易做法”，尽管在对国际商务、贸易赤字和关税上存重大误解，但“川普对中国（中共）的巧妙施压已经取得成功”。
　　报告说，“川普的对抗性贸易政策可能导向一个重大协议。虽然美中贸易谈判结果仍不明朗，但川普有望获得中国（中共）政府在贸易上的重大让步，这是奥巴马政府尝试过、却未能通过外交途径获得的让步。”
　　报告说，虽然北京可能再次不兑现承诺，但无疑川普的贸易策略“已突破北京迄今为止设置的一些难以逾越的屏障”。过去，北京一直为其贸易不端行为设置各类障碍。
　　除了对整体的不公贸易行为反制，川普政府也采取了进一步的行动，制裁一些中国公司，如中兴、华为等。
　　“自20世纪90年代中国的快速经济增长以来，与其任何前任相比，川普对北京施加了更大的经济压力、改变其（不公平）贸易做法。”报告写道。
　　保持美国在亚洲的威慑力
　　在亚洲地区安全方面，川普政府延续了奥巴马政府抑制中共日益增长影响力的做法，坚定地保持了美国在西太平洋争议地区的存在。
　　自川普上任以来，部署在亚洲的美国海军舰艇数量从奥巴马政府时期的273艘增加到287艘。在南中国海，美国海军至少已经进行了10次自由航行。到2019年2月（川普上任2年时间），海军军舰的自由航行次数是奥巴马政府8年任期总数的两倍。
　　美国印太司令部还在前沿地区部署了最先进的战机，包括F-35和P-8波塞冬海上巡逻机、无人驾驶飞行机以及远程轰炸机。
　　同时，川普政府加强对亚洲盟友的合作与信任。报告说，在川普任期内，美国“在很多方面一直与日本和其它传统地区伙伴保持着强大关系”，包括与日本自卫队的联合军演，与澳大利亚举行最大规模的军演。
　　川普政府还把印度作为其区域战略更重要的部分，包括2018年5月把美军太平洋司令部改名为印太司令部。同时，美国正计划与印度进行首次陆海空军演。
　　川普政府继续奥巴马政府的东南亚海洋安全计划，增拨3亿美元改善东南亚国家在孟加拉湾、南中国海和许多太平洋岛屿周边的通讯系统和巡逻能力。
　　报告认为，川普的整体外交政策比批评者认为的要好。 6park.com
Trump’s Foreign Policy Is a Work in Progress
His successes and failures defy simplistic, partisan assessment.
BY JOHN HANNAH | FEBRUARY 14, 2019, 3:10 PM
U.S. President Donald Trump and China's President Xi Jinping leave an event in Beijing on Nov. 9, 2017. (Nicolas Asfouri/AFP/Getty Images)
U.S. President Donald Trump and China's President Xi Jinping leave an event in Beijing on Nov. 9, 2017. (Nicolas Asfouri/AFP/Getty Images) 
After two years in office, the story of U.S. President Donald Trump’s foreign policy is not a straightforward one. 6park.com
Last month, my home base, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, released a midterm assessment of Trump’s foreign policy. I was one of the volume’s co-editors. It’s a collection of 21 essays, written by 27 authors and co-authors, evaluating the administration’s performance. No doubt to the consternation of Trump haters and lovers alike, the project steers away from efforts to make sweeping generalizations about the totality of the president’s national security policy. Instead, it sticks to a more focused and empirical approach, looking issue by issue at what the administration has done, what’s worked and what hasn’t, and what adjustments might be made. 6park.com
Perhaps inevitably, that kind of effort tends to produce a complicated picture of reality that may not satisfy political partisans on either side. But it’s probably a more accurate reflection of the actual state of affairs. One, for example, that can account for President Barack Obama’s former ambassador to Moscow, Michael McFaul, acknowledging in an interview that while he loathes Trump’s fawning posture toward Vladimir Putin, he also thinks that apart from the president, “the Trump administration’s policy toward Russia is pretty good, and in many ways better than the Obama administration.” Or that finds Obama’s right-hand man, Ben Rhodes, co-authoring an op-ed warning Democrats not to let their anger at Trump blind them to the significant merits of a tough approach toward Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro 6park.com
In his conclusion to the midterm project, my colleague Clifford May sums up the mixed picture that characterizes the administration’s foreign policy at the two-year mark: “I think it is clear,” he writes, “that Trump deserves more credit than his Democratic and Republican #NeverTrump critics give him, but less than his most fervent fans – and the president himself – like to claim.” That strikes me as fair—recognizing, of course, that depending on worldview and political outlook, different people will legitimately reach different conclusions about Trump’s overall balance sheet and the extent to which the good outweighs the bad, or vice versa. 6park.com
Several reporters have asked me what I thought were the best and worst elements of Trump’s foreign policy so far. While there are no doubt several possible candidates on both sides of the ledger, I’ve settled on two that I think could end up being particularly consequential, with lasting effects on U.S. policy that will likely extend beyond Trump’s presidency. 6park.com
Perhaps the administration’s most important national security contribution to date has been its unabashed willingness to identify China as the central threat to long-term U.S. interests. The decision to elevate great-power competition, especially with Beijing, to the top of the U.S. national security agenda is a very significant development, and long overdue. For nearly two decades, vast amounts of U.S. resources have been devoted to fighting terrorism, largely against sub-state actors, in an increasingly dysfunctional Middle East—at the cost of paying insufficient attention to the gathering danger posed by a rapidly strengthening, nuclear-armed, geostrategic rival determined to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests. The administration’s success in smashing the “responsible stakeholder” consensus that has dominated America’s China policy for decades and replacing it with a new paradigm of “strategic competition” is an extraordinarily important conceptual shift in U.S. strategic thought that will almost certainly have profound political, economic, and security ramifications for both the United States and the world. And in contrast to so much of the rest of Trump’s agenda, the imperative to adopt a more confrontational strategy toward China has very quickly won broad bipartisan support—increasing the odds that history will see it as an important moment of change that will shape U.S. foreign policy long after Trump departs the White House. 6park.com
Of course, skepticism abounds as to the president’s ability to sustain and manage such a comprehensive reorientation in U.S. strategy. Conceiving policy is one thing. Executing it another. In the first instance, there’s a concern that the notoriously impulsive Trump might preemptively abandon a get-tough approach that seeks systemic changes in Beijing’s bad behaviors in exchange for little more than narrow progress on the trade deficit, allowing him to claim a short-term political victory. Even more worrisome, however, is the question of whether Trump has the strategic competence to navigate what amounts to a new cold war with China—to keep it from turning hot while securing vital U.S. interests. History suggests that periods of power transition in international politics are notoriously risky under the best of circumstances. Adding an erratic and inexperienced president to the mix could well make it even more so. Nevertheless, valid as these concerns may be, they don’t negate the overriding importance of the administration’s clear-eyed prioritization of the China threat as the foremost challenge to U.S. national security in the 21st century. 6park.com
I’m less confident of my choice for the worst aspect of Trumpism abroad, but I’m going with Trump’s systematic denigration of the United States’ most important alliances. This unique network of close partnerships in both Europe and Asia with the world’s richest, most powerful liberal democracies has been an absolutely essential pillar of U.S. foreign-policy success for nearly eight decades—and the country’s most dangerous adversaries, particularly China and Russia, are not remotely capable of matching it. 6park.com
It’s not at all clear that Trump appreciates any of this. He instinctually sees traditional allies as competitors, rivals, and moochers, which blurs the distinction between friends and adversaries. One gets the sense that, for Trump, the post-World War II liberal international order has been one big con job—an epic swindle of U.S. wealth and power. He’s identified the European Union as one of his country’s greatest foes, a dangerous multilateral collective that’s taking advantage of the United States on trade and undermining the principle of national sovereignty—rather than one of the foundational building blocks of a democratic, capitalist West. For Trump, European unity is more a threat to be opposed than a strategic asset to be nurtured. When it comes to Europe, Trump’s goal seems to be divide and rule, fracturing the continent into competing states with which the United can negotiate one by one to get better trade deals—thus his enthusiasm for the populist wave now roiling many EU countries. The problem, of course, is that fatally weakening Europe’s most important institutions of collective action also happens to be among Russian President Vladimir Putin’s highest aspirations. 6park.com
Ditto the situation with NATO. Trump’s underlying antipathy toward the alliance has been fairly relentless. On more than one occasion, he’s raised doubts about his commitment to Article 5, NATO’s core obligation of collective defense. At several points in 2018, he reportedly expressed his desire to withdraw from the alliance altogether, telling top national security aides that he did not see NATO’s purpose while complaining that it was a drain on U.S. resources. Only slightly less barbed criticisms have also regularly been directed at the United States’ most important military alliances in Asia: those with Japan and South Korea. 6park.com
Trump’s defenders insist that all this hand-wringing over the fate of the U.S. alliance system is much ado about nothing. Trump’s harsh attacks on allies are only a negotiating tactic, they claim—a necessary shock to the system, to compel them to pick up a greater share of the burden. They correctly point out that several of Trump’s predecessors tried using more gentle tactics but largely failed. Trump’s hardball approach, in contrast, has been accompanied by important new increases in allied defense budgets and capabilities. And all the while, despite Trump’s rhetoric, his administration has systematically worked to bolster NATO’s vulnerable eastern flank. From this vantage point, Trump’s supporters argue, rather than dangerously undermining the United States’ system of alliances, Trump’s badgering over burden-sharing is actually an essential part of saving them—a long-overdue effort to ensure their continued viability in a world that is radically different from the one that existed at the time they were forged, when U.S. military and economic primacy went unchallenged and the American public was far more willing to subsidize global security.

贴主:XSNM于2019_04_19 17:51:50编辑