Bidenomics and Its Contradictions


与中国的竞争加强了美国总统拜登对工业政策的承诺，但他对政府干预的设想给美国经济和盟友带来风险。


2月19日，美国总统拜登在空军一号上与国家安全顾问沙利文会面。

美国总统拜登(Joe Biden)的国家安全顾问沙利文(Jake Sullivan)的工作通常专注于应对来自国外的威胁，比如俄罗斯对乌克兰的入侵或中国对台湾的企图。但今年4月份在布鲁金斯学会(Brookings Institution)的一次演讲中，他把矛头指向了他认为来自内部的一个威胁，即一种在华盛顿的精英头脑中主导了太久的想法：市场总能有效地分配资本。 6park.com
Jake Sullivan, President Joe Biden’s national security adviser, is usually preoccupied with threats from abroad, like the Russian invasion of Ukraine or China’s designs on Taiwan. In April, however, in a speech at the Brookings Institution, he took aim at what he sees as a threat from within, an idea that has reigned for too long among elites in Washington: that “markets always allocate capital productively and efficiently.” 6park.com
    
沙利文抨击的目标正是一些决策人士所称的新自由主义：信奉自由贸易和放任经济自由。几十年来，不管是共和党还是民主党上台，美国政府都秉持这一理念。但在沙利文眼中，这种理论掏空了美国的工业基础，损害了美国的中产阶级，并使美国在气候变化、新冠疫情和供应链方面陷入危险的脆弱境地，供应链掌握在敌对国家手中相当于使之成为对付美国的武器。沙利文表示，为了解决这些问题，美国需要采取一种新的方略，即“现代美国工业战略”，将由一个更有权威的联邦政府来引导投资、工业和贸易活动，从而保障中产阶级和巩固国家安全。 6park.com
Sullivan’s target was what some in the policy world call neoliberalism: the free-trade, laissez-faire economic priorities shared by Republican and Democratic administrations for decades. This doctrine, in his view, has hollowed out the U.S. industrial base, undermined America’s middle class and left the country dangerously vulnerable to climate change, Covid-19 and the weaponization of supply chains by hostile nations. To deal with these problems, Sullivan said, the U.S. needs a new approach, a “modern American industrial strategy” in which a more assertive federal government guides investment, industry and trade to bolster both the middle class and national security. 6park.com
   
自2020年总统大选以来，拜登的团队一直试图为美国政府的经济政策提出一套统一的理论。沙利文最近讲话的与众不同之处在于，他认为拜登的国内目标和以应对中国威胁为重点的外交政策构成一个整体。这是迄今为止对于所谓拜登经济学的最明确解释。但这个新观点也揭示了美国政府决策中的一些盲点和矛盾之处。 6park.com
Since the 2020 election, Biden’s team has tried to come up with a unified theory for the administration’s economic policies. What sets apart Sullivan’s recent remarks is his assertion that Biden’s domestic goals and foreign policy, focused on the threat posed by China, form an integrated whole. It is the most definitive statement to date of what we can call Bidenomics. It also reveals a number of blind spots and contradictions in the administration’s policies. 6park.com
    
根据沙利文过去几年所写文章，以及对与他和拜登关系密切的人的采访，可以提炼出拜登经济学的三大支柱。 6park.com
Three pillars of Bidenomics can be distilled from Sullivan’s writings over the years and interviews with people close to both him and Biden.


4月27日，沙利文在布鲁金斯学会的一次演讲中表示，美国需要采取一种新的方略，即“现代美国工业战略”。

首先，经济增长重质不重量。沙利文在他的演讲中说，过去的观点是“所有的增长都是有益增长”。无论增长是来自美国表现出色的金融领域，还是来自其他国家名列前茅的半导体生产领域，都无关紧要。如果较低的增长率意味着收入中位数上升、不平等减少以及在对国家安全或环境至关重要的领域增加国内投资，那么拜登经济学含蓄地表达了愿意接受较低平均增长率的意思。 6park.com
First, the quality of economic growth matters more than the quantity. The old view was that “all growth was good growth,” Sullivan said in his speech. It didn’t matter if growth came from the financial sector, where the U.S. excelled, or the production of semiconductors, where other countries rose to the top. Bidenomics implicitly cares not just about higher GDP growth but whether that growth brings higher median incomes, less inequality and more domestic investment in sectors crucial to national security or the environment. 6park.com
   
其次，自由放任主义退出，产业政策就位。市场分配资本是为了实现私人投资者的最高回报，但正如拜登经济学认为的那样，市场不会考虑气候变化、脆弱的供应链或地缘政治脆弱性等问题。这就是德国对俄罗斯天然气的依赖达到危险难度程度和中国主导诸多关键矿物和药品原料供应的原因。 6park.com
Second, laissez-faire is out, industrial policy is in. Markets allocate capital to achieve the highest return to private investors, but as Bidenomics sees it, they don’t take account of issues like climate change, fragile supply chains or geopolitical vulnerability. That is why Germany became dangerously dependent on Russian natural gas and China dominates the supply of many critical minerals and pharmaceutical ingredients. 6park.com
   
为了纠正这些市场失灵问题，拜登经济学力争通过规则、补贴和其他干预措施将私人资本引向拜登政府的重点发展领域。沙利文和他在奥巴马(Barack Obama)及拜登政府时期的同事Jennifer Harris在2020年发表在《外交政策》(Foreign Policy)杂志上的一篇文章中写道：“倡导产业政策曾被认为是一件令人尴尬的事情，而现在应被看作一件几乎显而易见的事。” 6park.com
To correct these market failures, Bidenomics aims to direct private capital toward favored sectors via regulations, subsidies and other interventions. “Advocating industrial policy…was once considered embarrassing—now it should be considered something close to obvious,” Sullivan and Jennifer Harris, a colleague in both the Obama and Biden administrations, wrote in a 2020 essay in Foreign Policy magazine. 6park.com
   
第三，贸易政策应该优先考虑美国工人，而非消费者。新自由主义认为，增加美国和外国公司的全球市场准入可促进竞争，降低消费者的成本，并为工人提供更好的工作。沙利文认为，这种安排对公司来说要比对工人有利得多。 6park.com
Third, trade policy should give priority to American workers, not consumers. Neoliberalism assumes that increased global market access for U.S. and foreign companies promotes competition, lowers costs for consumers and provides better jobs for workers. That arrangement, Sullivan maintains, has worked out much better for companies than for workers. 6park.com
   
相比之下，根据拜登经济学，美国的外交政策主张一系列经济利益，从工人权利到气候政策和税收合规等等。消费者和竞争并不是主要关注点。 6park.com
Under Bidenomics, by contrast, U.S. foreign policy champions a range of economic interests, from workers’ rights to climate policy and tax compliance. Consumers and competition are not primary concerns. 6park.com
   
现年46岁的沙利文在民主党的政策圈子深耕已久。在奥巴马政府期间，他为时任国务卿希拉里(Hillary Clinton)和副总统拜登提供咨询，之后在2016年担任希拉里总统竞选活动的首席外交政策顾问。他后来写道，他在20世纪80年代和90年代“秉持中间派政治立场”。 6park.com
Sullivan, 46, has a long pedigree in Democratic policy circles. He advised both Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Vice President Biden during the Obama administration before serving as chief foreign policy adviser to Clinton’s presidential campaign in 2016. He was, he later wrote, “steeped in the centrist politics” of the 1980s and 1990s. 6park.com
   
沙利文在接受采访和与同事的交谈中表示，当希拉里在民主党提名选举中差点输给极左派伯尼．桑德斯(Bernie Sanders)，然后在大选中落败特朗普(Donald Trump)时，他感觉到这种中间派立场出了问题；特朗普的民粹主义策略针对精英阶层。 6park.com
In interviews and conversations with associates, Sullivan has said that he sensed something was wrong with this centrist consensus when Clinton nearly lost the Democratic nomination to Bernie Sanders’s insurgent, hard-left challenge and then lost the election to Donald Trump, whose populist campaign targeted elites. 6park.com
   
像许多民主党人一样，沙利文在接下来的几年里试图弄清该党是如何脱离工人阶级的。2007-09年经济衰退“暴露了我们的政府未能保护公民免受无约束的过度市场化的冲击，”他在2018年的网络进步杂志《民主》(Democracy)上写道。 6park.com
Like many Democrats, Sullivan spent the next few years trying to figure out how the party had alienated the working class. The 2007-09 recession had “laid bare the failure of our government to protect its citizens from unchecked market excess,” he wrote in 2018 in Democracy, an online progressive magazine. 6park.com
   
他对于自由贸易的抨击最为猛烈，在他看来，之前两党都奉行自由贸易却没有顾及工薪阶层或关注中国对规则的破坏。如果建制派大佬要主张重返跨太平洋伙伴关系协定(TPP)，沙利文会质问他们是否了解这个协定的内容；TPP是一个雄心勃勃的自由贸易协定，最初由奥巴马政府谈判签署，而后特朗普宣布退出，该协定目前有12个成员国。 6park.com
He reserved his harshest criticism for free trade, which both parties, in his view, had embraced without regard for working-class communities or China’s rule-breaking. When establishment gurus would argue for a return to the 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an ambitious free-trade pact that Obama had negotiated and Trump repudiated, Sullivan would ask if they even knew what was in it. 6park.com
   
沙利文对国内种种问题的诊断后来又融合了一种不断强化的观点，即美国从20世纪90年代开始的对华接触政策是失败的。习近平领导下的中国没有变得更加开放、自由和以市场为导向，而是更加压抑，并且为追求科技主导地位不惜一切。 6park.com
Sullivan’s diagnosis of domestic failings later merged with a growing conviction that the U.S. policy of engagement toward China, dating from the 1990s, was failing. Instead of becoming more open, liberal and market-oriented, China under Xi Jinping had become more repressive and was using every available tool to pursue technological dominance. 6park.com
   
沙利文认为，对于如何与中国竞争，在经济上显然可以借鉴美国当年应对苏联挑战的方式。他和Harris在他们2020年的论文中写道，冷战期间美国的战略设计者认为，“要想在竞争中战胜苏联，就必须摒弃大萧条之前开始实施的那种自由放任的经济理念”。 6park.com
To Sullivan’s mind, the obvious economic template for competing with China is how the U.S. met the challenge of the Soviet Union. He and Harris wrote in their 2020 essay that the architects of American strategy during the Cold War believed “that out-competing the Soviets called for discarding the laissez-faire economic philosophies” from before the Depression. 6park.com
   
二战之后，美国联邦政府对州际公路等基础设施以及半导体和卫星等技术的投资遏制了来自苏联的威胁，同时刺激了国内经济的广泛增长与创新。 6park.com
In the postwar era, federal investment in infrastructure such as interstate highways and technology such as semiconductors and satellites countered the Soviet threat while spurring broad-based economic growth and innovation at home. 6park.com
   
沙利文承认，这两种情形并不完全吻合。他在2019年与库尔特·坎贝尔(Kurt Campbell)在《外交》(Foreign Affairs)杂志上撰文称，与苏联相比，中国“在经济上更强大，在外交上更老道，在意识形态上更灵活”。尽管如此，他们写道，应对中国的威胁“将需要美国像20世纪50年代和60年代那样调动国内资源”。坎贝尔现在任拜登的亚洲政策主管。 6park.com
Sullivan recognizes that the analogy is imperfect. China is “more formidable economically, more sophisticated diplomatically and more flexible ideologically than the Soviet Union ever was,” he wrote in Foreign Affairs in 2019 with Kurt Campbell, now Biden’s top Asia adviser. Nonetheless, they wrote, meeting China’s threat “will require the kind of domestic mobilization that the United States pursued in the 1950s and 1960s.” 6park.com
  
沙利文发现，他的新经济主张与拜登不谋而合。在奥巴马政府中拜登的观点与新自由主义者一直有些格格不入。沙利文和像布莱恩·迪斯(Brian Deese)这样的同僚把拜登的政策心得纳入一项现代产业战略，包括立法为公共基础设施拨款1万亿美元，为半导体制造和研发拨款530亿美元，以及为电动汽车和可再生能源拨款多达1万亿美元。迪斯之前是白宫国家经济委员会主任，今年2月份卸任。 6park.com
Sullivan found that his new views on economics converged with Biden’s, which had never meshed well with the neoliberals in the Obama administration. Sullivan and colleagues like Brian Deese, who headed the White House National Economic Council until February, have framed Biden’s achievements as components of a modern industrial strategy, including laws earmarking $1 trillion for public infrastructure, $53 billion for semiconductor fabrication and research, and as much as $1 trillion for electric vehicles and renewable energy. 6park.com
   
他们认为不属于拜登产业战略的一项政策是对向中国出口半导体技术的新限制。沙利文4月份曾说，这种限制完全是为了国家安全，是遵循“小院高墙”的原则；所谓“小院高墙”是指美国对一小部分核心技术实施非常严格的限制。“我们只是在确保美国和盟友的技术不会被用来对付我们。我们并不是在切断贸易往来。” 6park.com
One policy they don’t consider a part of Biden’s industrial strategy is new restrictions on the export of semiconductor technology to China. Sullivan said in April that such restrictions are solely aimed at national security, adhering to the principle of “a small yard and a high fence”: a narrow set of technologies where the U.S. imposes very strict restrictions. “We are simply ensuring that U.S. and allied technology is not used against us. We are not cutting off trade.”


2月15日，美国总统拜登在马里兰州拉纳姆和工会组织国际电气工人兄弟会Local 26谈论经济。

但这些限制显然是拜登经济学整体战略的一个补充。技术知识向中国的转移是造成美国产业空心化的一个因素，而出口限制助推了了美国半导体投资的激增。 6park.com
But the restrictions clearly complement the larger thrust of Bidenomics. The migration of technological know-how to China has been a factor in U.S. deindustrialization, and export restrictions are one of the drivers of surging semiconductor investment in the U.S. 6park.com
   
沙利文和拜登的其他顾问试图让拜登经济学包含拜登政府议程的大量内容，这显示了拜登经济学的抱负。但在这样做的同时，他们也凸显了该议程中的诸多问题。 6park.com
Sullivan and other Biden advisers have shown the ambition of Bidenomics by trying to have it encompass so much of the administration’s agenda. In doing so, however, they have also highlighted many problems with that agenda. 6park.com
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例如，基本的经济学观点认为，资本和劳动力是有限的，因此需要以最大限度提高生产力和增长的方式来进行分配。经验已经痛苦地表明，政府在这方面的能力比市场差得多。当然，市场失灵是存在的，例如污染或军事脆弱性，但这些都是例外情况。 6park.com
For example, basic economics tells us that capital and labor are finite, so they need to be allocated in a way that maximizes productivity and growth. Experience has shown, painfully, that governments are much worse at this than markets. Market failures exist, of course, such as pollution or military vulnerability, but they are exceptions. 6park.com
  
拜登经济学接受市场的价值，但认为市场失灵无处不在，从地区、种族和性别不平等，到缺乏农村高速互联网和价格亲民的儿童保育服务等。 6park.com
Bidenomics accepts the value of markets but sees market failure all around, in everything from regional, racial and gender inequities to the lack of rural high-speed internet and affordable child care. 6park.com
   
当市场失灵的定义如此宽泛时，政府干预实际上就没有限制性原则了。拜登和其他民主党领导人甚至已主张对无数与军事或经济安全只有最微弱联系的产品和行业给予特殊待遇，如用于基础设施的石膏板和木材。 6park.com
When market failure is so broadly defined, there is effectively no limiting principle on government intervention. And indeed, Biden and other leading Democrats have argued for special treatment for countless products and industries with only the most tenuous connection to military or economic security, such as the drywall and lumber used in infrastructure. 6park.com
   
在国会代表硅谷的进步派人士Ro Khanna希望，目前针对半导体的补贴也能用于铝、钢铁、造纸、微电子、汽车零部件和气候技术。他在4月份表示：“美国需要有能力在本地生产基础产品。我会走访一个又一个工业城镇，看看我们能做些什么来振兴那些地方。” 6park.com
Ro Khanna, a progressive who represents Silicon Valley in Congress, wants the sort of subsidies now directed to semiconductors to go also to aluminum, steel, paper, microelectronics, auto parts and climate technology. “America needs to be able to make basic things here. I would go to factory town after factory town and see what we can do to revitalize that place,” he said in April.


4月21日，工人们在洛杉矶港安装太阳能电池板，来为一个专注于清洁能源的技术中心供电。

但美国没有能力将现在进口的所有东西都转为国内供应。让美国工人转而生产本可廉价进口的产品，这种做法会提高成本，并使本就稀缺的工人离开那些或许生产力更高的行业。彼得森国际经济研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)所长Adam Posen在最近的一篇批评文章中写道，产业政策“并不创造就业；它只是将工作从一个地方转移到另一个地方”。“至于拥有合适技能的闲置工人，”他继续写到，“其实并不存在”。 6park.com
But the U.S. doesn’t have the capacity to supply everything it now imports. Diverting workers to make things that can be imported more cheaply raises costs and takes scarce workers away from industries that might be more productive. Industrial policy “does not create jobs; it merely shifts jobs from one place to another,” wrote Adam Posen, president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, in a recent critique. “As for idle workers with the right skills,” he continued, “they don’t really exist.” 6park.com
   
太阳能电池板的生产反映出在调和政府不同优先事项方面的问题。拜登制定了到2030年在美国实现100%无碳电力的目标，他认为这将对气候有帮助，并可为美国人创造高薪岗位。尽管有补贴和保护性关税，但美国的太阳能产业规模太小，无法满足美国的需求。因此，在公用事业部门和太阳能安装商的要求下，拜登于去年6月下令暂停对从亚洲进口的太阳能电池板征收关税，此举赢得了环保组织的赞扬，但遭到了国内制造商的抨击，参议院两党已投票推翻了这一决定。 6park.com
Solar-panel production illustrates the problem of reconciling the administration’s divergent priorities. Biden has set the goal of 100% carbon-free electricity in the U.S. by 2030, which he maintains will help the climate and create well-paying American jobs. The U.S. has long imposed tariffs on imports of solar equipment from China in response to its subsidies and “dumping” (selling at unfairly low prices). But U.S. production is still too small to supply U.S. needs. So at the behest of utilities and solar installers, Biden paused tariffs last June on solar panels imported from Asia, earning praise from environmental groups but condemnation from domestic manufacturers and a bipartisan vote in the Senate to block the move. 6park.com
   
与太阳能电池板不同，半导体对民用工业和军事防御都至关重要，甚至许多新自由主义者也支持通过补贴来减少美国对中国、台湾和韩国的依赖。但为了与拜登经济学对市场失灵的广义定义保持一致，商务部表示，补贴取决于接受方是否愿意实现一系列其他政府目标：提供儿童保育、按工会工资标准付工资、雇用工会工人、不回购股票、不在中国投资，并与联邦政府分享利润。让产业政策背负如此多的附加目标，削弱了它的效力。 6park.com
Unlike solar panels, semiconductors are critical to both civilian industry and military defense, and even many neoliberals support subsidies to reduce U.S. dependence on China, Taiwan and South Korea. But in keeping with Bidenomics’ broad definition of market failure, the Commerce Department has said the subsidies are contingent on the willingness of recipients to meet a range of other administration goals: to offer child care, pay union-scale wages, hire unionized workers, refrain from buying back stock or investing in China, and share profits with the federal government. Saddling industrial policy with so many ancillary goals dilutes its impact. 6park.com
   
尽管沙利文坚持认为，拜登经济学的对外政策和对内政策是相辅相成的，但两者之间也存在矛盾。拜登政府在寻求与志同道合的伙伴团结一致对抗俄罗斯和中国的同时，其“买美国货”的政策也在歧视这些伙伴。 6park.com
The foreign and domestic arms of Bidenomics are also at odds with each other, despite Sullivan’s insistence that they are complementary. While seeking solidarity with like-minded partners against Russia and China, the buy-American policies of the Biden administration discriminate against those same partners. 6park.com
   
拜登将新宣布的在美国建设电动汽车和电池厂的计划增多归功于去年的《通胀削减法案》(Inflation Reduction Act)，但其他国家却抱怨，该法最慷慨的补贴只提供给在北美组装的汽车。德国财政部长克里林德纳(Christian Lindner)对一家德国报纸说：“美国是我们的伙伴，与我们有共同的价值观，但与此同时，美国也有个一庞大的经济保护主义政策。” 6park.com
Biden credits last year’s Inflation Reduction Act for a boom in newly announced electric-vehicle and battery factories in the U.S., but other countries have complained because the law’s most generous subsidies go only to vehicles assembled in North America. “The U.S.A. is our partner of shared values, but at the same time there is an enormously protectionist economic policy,” German finance minister Christian Lindner told a German newspaper.


一些盟友对拜登政府在工业和贸易政策方面的做法感到不满；5月20日，在广岛举行的七国集团峰会上，拜登与其他七国集团领导人和嘉宾合影。

为了平息盟友的愤怒，拜登政府在实施这项法律的规则中加入了特例，将更多外国电动汽车包含在其中。但与暂停对亚洲太阳能电池板加征关税一样，此举激怒了美国国会，包括许多渴望支持国内制造业的民主党人。 6park.com
Those complaints have since subsided as the Biden administration has opened negotiations with allies over common standards for critical minerals used in batteries, and interpreted the law in a way that allows in more foreign EVs. But the latter move upset some Democrats in Congress eager to support domestic manufacturing.  6park.com
   
与特朗普不同，拜登并不寻求撕毁现有的自由贸易协定或提高关税。但他对新的贸易协定或降低关税也不感兴趣。他的《印太经济繁荣框架》（Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, 简称IPEF）寻求与该地区的盟友在劳动条件、气候政策、税收合规和腐败问题上进行合作，但并没有像该框架的前身TPP那样，提供更多进入美国市场的机会作为回报。对外国贸易伙伴来说，这是一个不尽人意的提议。一位印度尼西亚官员说，与其说是胡萝卜加大棒，不如说是大棒加大棒。 6park.com
Unlike Donald Trump, Biden isn’t seeking to tear up existing free trade agreements or to raise tariffs. But neither is he interested in new trade agreements or lowering tariffs. His Indo-Pacific Economic Framework seeks cooperation with allies in the region on labor conditions, climate policy, tax compliance and corruption, but it doesn’t offer increased access to the U.S. market in return, as the TPP, its rejected predecessor, did. To foreign trade partners, it’s an underwhelming proposition. Instead of a carrot and stick, “it’s a stick and a stick,” one Indonesian official said. 6park.com
  
那么，拜登经济学的替代方案是什么？就其本身而言，放松美国市场的准入不会争取到更多亚洲国家来支持美国对抗中国。但就像冷战一样，与中国的较量将是一场持久战。达特茅斯学院(Dartmouth College)研究贸易政策的历史学家Doug Irwin称，如果在该地区没有积极主动的贸易战略，美国的缺席将造成真空，变成中国的一言堂，美国将失去影响力。 6park.com
So what’s the alternative to Bidenomics? By itself, more generous access to the American market won’t win over more Asian countries to the side of the U.S. in confronting China. But like the Cold War, the contest with China will be a long game. Without “a proactive trade strategy with the region, the U.S. absence creates a vacuum that makes China the only game in town, and the U.S. loses influence,” said Doug Irwin, a trade policy historian at Dartmouth College. 6park.com
  
新加坡总理李显龙(Lee Hsien Loong)一年前对《华尔街日报》(The Wall Street Journal)编辑部说，美国放弃TPP时无异于让大门敞开，现在有别人在敲门了。 6park.com
Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong told The Wall Street Journal’s editorial board a year ago that when the U.S. abandoned TPP, “you left the door open, and somebody else is now knocking on the door.” 6park.com
  
即使美国不重新加入TPP，也有很多其他方式来深化贸易联系。曾在比尔·克林顿(Bill Clinton)和奥巴马手下任职、现为美国驻日本大使的伊曼纽尔(Rahm Emanuel)主张向日本出口阿拉斯加液化天然气，不过这与拜登的长期气候目标相悖。伊曼纽尔在一次接受采访时说，亚洲国家“想要我们的军事领导力、外交领导力和经济领导力”。 6park.com
Even if the U.S. stays out of TPP, there are ample other ways to deepen trade ties. Rahm Emanuel, who served under both Bill Clinton and Obama and is now the U.S. ambassador to Japan, has argued for exporting Alaskan liquefied natural gas to Japan, though that runs counter to Biden’s long-run climate goals. Asian countries “want our military leadership, our diplomatic leadership and our economic leadership,” Mr. Emanuel said in an interview. 6park.com
   
其实，这是拜登经济学没有吸取的一个冷战教训。之前的多任美国总统都认为，贸易和投资通过将其他国家与美国更紧密地联系在一起，帮助维持了由美国主导的国际秩序。1962年，时任美国总统约翰·肯尼迪(John F. Kennedy)要求国会扩大谈判贸易协定的权力时称，“我们对西方政治团结的维护也在很大程度上取决于西方经济团结的程度。” 6park.com
Indeed, that’s a Cold War lesson that Bidenomics has failed to learn. Until very recently, U.S. presidents thought that trade and investment, by binding other countries more closely to the U.S., helped to sustain the U.S.-led international order. “Our maintenance of Western political unity depends in equally large measure upon the degree of Western economic unity,” President John F. Kennedy said in 1962, asking Congress for expanded authority to negotiate trade agreements. 6park.com
  
这种方法没能让中国变得友好和自由，但对西欧、日本和韩国却惊人地有效。这解释了为什么这些国家在对拜登经济学的某些方面不满的情况下也加入了拜登的联盟，与中国和俄罗斯对抗。 6park.com
This approach failed to make China friendly and free, but it worked spectacularly with Western Europe, Japan and South Korea. It explains why, despite their unhappiness with aspects of Bidenomics, these countries have stepped up to join Biden’s coalition for confronting China and Russia too.