Neville Maxwell 是一位澳大利亚记者，他曾经写了一本书很好的书, 
"India's China War", 指责印度是1962中印冲突的罪魁。这本书在amazon 
有售:　https://www.amazon.com/Indias-China-War-Neville-Maxwell/dp/8181582500/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1500125836&sr=8-1&keywords=indias+china+war

他昨天发表新文章，”This is India’s China war, Round 
Two“，　重温１９６２年中印冲突历史，同时指出这次中印边境也是印度在挑衅：http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2102555/indias-china-war-round-two

请大家在网上有机会就宣传Maxwell 的书和文章，因为现在中印的公共舆论战中印度占了上峰。

以下是　Maxwell　文章：


This is India’s China war, Round Two：The 
absurd myth of an ‘unprovoked Chinese aggression’ in 1962 has fermented 
in India a persistent longing for revenge

－By Neville Maxwell－

With India and China interacting over more than 3,000km of undefined 
frontier, friction is constant and that one day it would break back into
 border war has seemed inevitable. Two great Indian delusions have 
created this situation.

 

The lesser of these was the outright falsehood spun in the shock of 
immediate and utter Indian defeat in 1962’s Round One border war with 
China, when, after the hesitant launch of an Indian offensive to drive 
the Chinese out of India-claimed territory on the Chinese side of the 
McMahon Line, the pre-emptive Chinese counter-attack had in little more 
than a month crushed the Indian Army. It enabled the People’s Liberation
 Army (PLA) to vacate all the territory it had occupied with nothing 
more than the minatory – and humiliating – warning to India, “don’t 
challenge us again”.

 

The absurd myth of an “unprovoked Chinese aggression” which had taken
 India by surprise was promulgated to resurrect the broken image of 
“Pandit” Jawaharlal Nehru, the prime minister personally and 
pre-eminently responsible for the national disaster. Although long ago 
exposed and belied internationally, in India the myth has fermented in 
high military as well as political circles a longing for revenge.

 

The underlying and greater delusion is that India’s geographical 
limits are set by millennial historical forces. The process of boundary 
formation established and required by the international community 
(negotiation to achieve agreement on border alignment and cooperation to
 demarcate the agreed alignment on the ground) thus becomes otiose for 
the Indian republic. India, having “discovered” the alignment of its 
borders through historical research, need only display them on its 
official maps and those would become defined international boundaries 
“not open to discussion with anybody”, as Nehru put it in a notorious 
order in 1954.

He applied his own ruling literally and categorically, rejecting 
Beijing’s repeated calls for negotiation; and every one of his scores of
 successors in the Indian leadership has clung, or felt nailed to, that 
obdurate and provocative stance, in effect claiming the sole right 
unilaterally to define China’s as well as India’s borders. Every 
generation of literate Indians is inculcated with that false sense of 
national oppression by the cartographic image showing broad areas of 
Indian territory “occupied” by China, with reminders that Beijing’s maps
 reveal an intention to seize even more.

The Sino-Indian interface along the undefined and contested frontier 
is consequently and constantly a source of international friction, 
waiting only for incidental sparks to set off martial conflagration.

Border war was narrowly averted in 1987 when a belligerent Indian 
Army commander, General Krishnaswamy Sundarj, having been foiled in his 
plan to render Pakistan a “broken-back state”, turned his attention to 
the China border. He massively reinforced positions there and in 
deliberate provocation pushed numerous posts across the established 
McMahon line of actual control. China reacted with matching troop 
concentrations and air force inductions, and warned India to desist from
 its aggressions, which, in the late summer of 1987, it did, probably 
under US pressure.

The heat went out of the confrontation but the Indian Army was left 
in a grossly unbalanced situation, with great troop concentrations 
beyond normal supply reach. That predicament induced a new Indian 
government, under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, to negotiate in 1993 
India’s one and only border agreement with the PRC: jointly to observe 
the line of actual control (LAC) and to reduce force levels to a 
practical minimum. Later, developments fell far short of what the treaty
 required.

The current confrontation in the Sikkim sector might appear to have 
similar origins in military rather than political assertions, with 
India’s army chief, General Bipin Rawat, beating his chest with boasts 
that India can fight and win on “two and a half” fronts simultaneously.

 

But the context points to deeper factors. India has recently been 
goading China in what can only have been a purposeful series of actions.
 Rather than let the LAC mature with the passing years, India has been 
needling Beijing by taking such doll figures as the Dalai Lama
 and loud-mouthed American diplomats into the disputed border region 
India proclaims to be its state of Arunachal Pradesh, and megaphoning 
the false claim that the McMahon alignment represents a legal boundary 
rather than a historical but contested claim. The McMahon Line in fact 
rests on a British diplomatic forgery,
 long exposed. This may be another indication that Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi has decided that India’s interest will be served better in
 an aggressive American alliance rather than in a neighbourly 
relationship with China.

 

The sudden convergence of Indian and Chinese troop concentrations 
around the current military confrontation in Doklam illustrates again 
the truth of Curzon’s observation in his Oxford lecture that borders can
 be “the razor’s edge on which hang suspended the modern issue of war or
 peace”. There is a spicy historical irony here because this 
confrontation is precisely sited in the single, tiny Sino-Indian border 
sector that was long ago treaty-defined and demarcated.

 

In 1890, rational self-interest brought the mighty British Raj to sit
 down in conference, as if on equal terms, with the ruler of the 
Lilliputian Himalayan state of Sikkim, agree on the alignment of the 
state’s border and jointly mark that out on the ground. Time, weather 
and probably local human mischief will have obliterated the border 
markers but the careful verbal description in the Treaty prevails to 
prove that the local Indian commander, with or without higher orders, 
has blatantly moved forces into what is now Chinese territory. Beijing, 
sorely chafed already by India’s recent repeated provocations, appears 
to have decided that this is too much, and has itself adopted the 
absolutist Nehruvian position of “no discussion without withdrawal”.

 

The Indian attempt to depict this confrontation as tripartite should 
be disregarded. Bhutan is not an independent actor, is rather an Indian 
glove-puppet. A brigade group of the Indian Army, permanently stationed 
in Bhutan and now reinforced, is an ever-present reminder to Bhutan’s 
ruling group of what happened to Sikkim when its ruler aspired to 
independence – speedy annexation.

Thus this still petty armed confrontation has a real and potentially 
enormous explosive potential – Round Two of Sino-Indian war. The way 
out, and ahead, lies where it always has been, in the opening of 
comprehensive, unconditional Sino-Indian boundary negotiation. What bars
 the way is the requirement of Indian policy reversal, which in the 
current bellicose mood and twisted popular sense of injury in India 
would require heroic bravery of leadership.

There is an example of just such an action, which seeded what now 
appears to be the key geopolitical factor of the age, the Sino-Russian 
alliance: Gorbachev’s reversal of the Soviets’ no-negotiation stance in 
the border dispute with China, blooded in the Zhenbao Island battles of 
1969. From the long-extended negotiations to compromise severely 
clashing territorial claims emerged a mutual confidence and trust that, 
annealed by common exposure to American hostility, set into an alliance 
just short of formal declaration. Should a leader ever emerge in India 
with the courage and vision Gorbachev showed, such too could be a Sino-Indian future.

Neville Maxwell, who covered the 1962 China-India border war as the 
South Asia correspondent for The Times, is the author of India’s China 
War. In March 2014, Maxwell leaked the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report, 
an Indian government report from 1963 examining India’s defeat in the 
Sino-Indian War that is yet to be declassified.

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