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朝鲜战争中美国究竟有没有威胁使用原子弹?
送交者: mingxiaot[♂☆★★声望品衔12★★☆♂] 于 2021-04-06 22:07 已读 7546 次 24 赞  

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我靠,大家都不上网查些资料就哇哩哇啦吗?我已经说了我查资料的方式,在Google输入douglas macarthur,nuclear weapon。可还是看到了岛兄这篇“雄文”:  6park.com

  美国韩战时哪个爷要对中国扔原子弹 6park.com

  6park.com

文中一段这么写的:“既然找不到麦克阿瑟说的证据,那么麦克阿瑟就是没说! 那谁说了?难道是美国总统杜鲁门? 据本人知道,杜鲁门也从未公开说过!1950年11月30日,美国总统杜鲁门召开新闻发布会上,在回答有关朝鲜前线局势的记者问时,说道 “我们将会采取所有必要的步骤来满足目前的军事需要”。一个记者提问: 所有必要步骤是否包括原子弹?老杜没有正面回答,而是含糊的“包括我们武器库中所有武器”。我擦!这句话还没来得及吓住斯毛金爷仨,先把英国首相艾德礼吓尿了,要不人家怎么说英国工党的人都是些垃圾操行呢。老艾想,你们洋基佬在亚洲没啥利益,夏威夷关岛离大陆甚远,俺大英帝国可是有个香港就在大陆边上,你这一用原子弹,俺那香港咋办?这事是绝对不可以的。其实杜鲁门也就随口那么一说,含糊其辞,你咋理解都可以。” 6park.com

  6park.com

好在俺查到了这段原文: 6park.com

“Q. Mr. President, I wonder if we could retrace that reference to the atom bomb? Did we understand you clearly that the use of the atomic bomb is under active consideration? 6park.com

Truman: Always has been. It is one of our weapons. 6park.com

Q. Does that mean, Mr. President, use against military objectives, or civilian— 6park.com

Truman: It's a matter that the military people will have to decide. I'm not a military authority that passes on those things. 6park.com

Q. Mr. President, perhaps it would be better if we are allowed to quote your remarks on that directly? 6park.com

Truman: I don't think—I don't think that is necessary. 6park.com

Q. Mr. President, you said this depends on United Nations action. Does that mean that we wouldn't use the atomic bomb except on a United Nations authorization? 6park.com

Truman: No, it doesn't mean that at all. The action against Communist China depends on the action of the United Nations. The military commander in the field will have charge of the use of the weapons, as he always has. ” 6park.com

这一段我看古狗翻译还行,就懒得修改了。 6park.com

“问:主席先生,我想知道我们是否可以追溯到原子弹的提法?我们是否清楚地了解到您正在积极考虑使用原子弹? 6park.com

杜鲁门:一直都是。它是我们的武器之一。 6park.com

问:主席先生,这是出于军事目的还是平民目的? 6park.com

杜鲁门:这是军人必须决定的事情。我不是传递这些东西的军事机构。 6park.com

问:主席先生,也许允许我们直接引用您的评论会更好吗? 6park.com

杜鲁门:我不认为-我认为那不是必需的。 6park.com

问:主席先生,您说这取决于联合国的行动。这是否意味着除非获得联合国授权,否则我们不会使用原子弹? 6park.com

杜鲁门:不,那根本不是那个意思。针对共产主义中国的行动取决于联合国的行动。一如既往,军事指挥官将负责武器的使用。” 6park.com

  6park.com

这一段是含糊其辞吗?如果岛兄真这么认为,我们的中英文估计是在两个宇宙。 6park.com

  6park.com

下面三篇按我前面所说方法查到的文章,只想说明在朝鲜可能或威胁使用原子弹的观点在美国实际相当流行,不光是老共凭空想象出的三视欺骗,因为“我国人民文化素质普遍低下,字多了的话很难记住,把12个字的句子总结成二个字的“三视”,人民群众比较容易记住。 煽动仇恨这一招,内战时期过去是靠白毛女杨白劳之类的东西,到韩战时不太好使,所以就用原子弹吧!” 6park.com

  6park.com

第一篇: 6park.com

How the Korean War Almost Went Nuclear (朝鲜战争如何差点进入核战?) 6park.com

In 1950, Harry Truman had to decide whether to use B-29s to drop atomic bombs. 1950年哈里 杜鲁门曾经考虑使用B-29投掷核弹) 6park.com

https://www.airspacemag.com/military-aviation/how-korean-war-almost-went-nuclear-180955324/ 6park.com

  6park.com

从中间选了一段: 6park.com

With the Chinese intervention, the United States confronted a hard truth: Threatening a nuclear attack would not be enough to win the war. It was as if the Chinese hadn’t noticed—or, worse, weren’t impressed by—the atomic-capable B-29s waiting at Guam. 6park.com

President Truman raised the ante. At a November press conference, he told reporters he would take whatever steps were necessary to win in Korea, including the use of nuclear weapons. Those weapons, he added, would be controlled by military commanders in the field. 6park.com

In April of the next year, Truman put the finishing touches on Korea’s nuclear war. He allowed nine nuclear bombs with fissile cores to be transferred into Air Force custody and transported to Okinawa. Truman also authorized another deployment of atomic-capable B-29s to Okinawa. Strategic Air Command set up a command-and-control team in Tokyo. 6park.com

This spate of atomic diplomacy coincided with the end of the role played by Douglas MacArthur. After MacArthur had publicly and repeatedly differed with the president over military strategy in Korea, Truman replaced him with General Matthew Ridgway, who was given “qualified authority” to use the bombs if he felt he had to. 6park.com

In October, there would be an epilogue of sorts to the Korean nuclear war. Operation Hudson Harbor would conduct several mock atomic bombing runs with dummy or conventional bombs across the war zone. Called “terrifying” by some historians, Hudson Harbor merely tested the complex nuclear-strike machinery, as the Strategic Air Command had been doing for years over American cities. 6park.com

But the nuclear Korean war had already ended. In June 1951, the atomic-capable B-29s flew home, carrying their special weapons with them. They had never entered the battle zone proper, and they had not been part of FEAF Bomber Command’s strategic bombing campaign. 6park.com

在中国的干预下,美国面临一个硬道理:威胁进行核攻击不足以赢得战争。好像中国人没有注意到,或者更糟糕的是,对具有原子弹攻击能力的B-29在关岛停留没有留下深刻的印象。 杜鲁门总统提高了赌注。在11月的新闻发布会上,他告诉记者,他将采取一切必要步骤在朝鲜获胜,包括使用核武器。他补充说,这些武器将由该地区的军事指挥官控制。 6park.com

次年4月,杜鲁门为朝鲜的核战争选择作出了最后决定。他允许将9枚具有裂变核的核炸弹移交给空军管理,并运送至冲绳。杜鲁门还授权向冲绳再次部署具有原子能力的B-29。战略空中司令部在东京成立了指挥与控制团队。 6park.com

这一系列原子外交的操作正好碰上终结道格拉斯·麦克阿瑟(在朝鲜战争中)所扮演的角色。麦克阿瑟在和总统就朝鲜的军事战略反复公开辩论之后,杜鲁门决定由马修·李奇韦将军接替他。李奇微得到了“合格的权限”:如果他认为自己必须这样做的话,可以使用这种炸弹(原子弹)。 6park.com

十月,朝鲜的核战争(选择)还有一点尾声:哈德逊港行动将在整个战区使用虚拟或常规炸弹进行几次模拟原子弹轰炸。哈德森港(行动)被一些历史学家称为“恐吓”,仅测试了复杂的核打击机器,就像战略空军司令部多年来在美国城市中所做的那样。 6park.com

然而朝鲜核战争(行动)结束了。 1951年6月,具有原子攻击能力的B-29带着他们的特殊武器飞回了家。他们从未进入过适当的战区,也没有参加FEAF轰炸机司令部的战略轰炸活动。 6park.com

第二篇What If the

United States had Used the Bomb in Korea? (如果美国在朝鲜使用了核弹?)

Cooler heads prevailed in the end, but nuclear use was a real possibility in the Korean War.

(虽然最后的思考更为冷静,但朝鲜战争真有可能使用核子武器) 6park.com

https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/what-if-the-united-states-had-used-the-bomb-in-korea/ 6park.com

只选了第一段: 6park.com

As the magnitude of the Chinese counter-offensive of November 1950 became clear, U.S. commanders, in particular General Douglas MacArthur, sought the authority to conduct attacks against People’s Liberation Army (PLA) staging areas in Manchuria. MacArthur believed that air and sea attacks could help stall the momentum of the Chinese assault, hopefully saving the U.S. position in Korea.  Although MacArthur never formally requested the authority to use nuclear weapons, many in the government (including President Truman) believed that he wanted such authority. Meanwhile, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) began transferring nuclear components to Guam, in contingency preparation for a potential nuclear assault. 6park.com

随着1950年11月中国反攻的规模逐渐明朗,美国指挥官,特别是道格拉斯·麦克阿瑟将军,寻求授权对满洲的人民解放军(PLA)集结地区发动攻击。 麦克阿瑟认为,空袭和海上袭击可能有助于阻止中国发动进攻的势头,有望挽救美国在韩国的地位。 尽管麦克阿瑟从未正式要求使用核武器的授权,但政府中的许多人(包括杜鲁门总统)都认为他想要这种授权。 同时,美国空军(USAF)开始将核部件转移到关岛,为潜在的核袭击做好应急准备。 6park.com

第三篇是从Wikipedia Relief of Douglas MacArthur (麦克阿瑟的解职)一文所选,因文章中提到很多参考文献。如果有谁觉得该文不准确,可以自己想办法去查。 6park.com

Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relief_of_Douglas_MacArthur

On 9 December

1950, MacArthur requested field commander's discretion to employ nuclear weapons; he testified that such an employment would only be used to prevent an ultimate fallback, not to recover the situation in Korea.[92] On 24 December 1950, MacArthur submitted a list of "retardation targets" in Korea, Manchuria and other parts of China, for which 34 atomic bombs would be required.[92][93][94][95] In June 1950, Louis Johnson released a study on the potential uses of radioactive agents. According to Major General Courtney Whitney, MacArthur considered the possibility of using radioactive wastes to seal off North Korea in December 1950, but he never submitted this to the Joint Chiefs. After his dismissal, Senator Albert Gore Sr. put a similar proposal to Truman.[96] In January 1951, MacArthur refused to entertain proposals for the forward deployment of nuclear weapons.[97] 6park.com

1950年12月9日,麦克阿瑟(MacArthur)要求野战指挥官酌情决定(是否)使用核武器。 他作证说,这种工作只会万不得已用于避免最后的紧急撤退,而不会用作恢复韩国的战场局面。[92] 1950年12月24日,麦克阿瑟(MacArthur)提交了在韩国,满洲和中国其他地区的“迟滞目标”清单,为此需要34枚原子弹。[92] [93] [94] [95] 1950年6月,路易斯·约翰逊(Louis Johnson)发表了有关放射性物质潜在用途的研究。 根据考特尼·惠特尼少将的说法,麦克阿瑟在1950年12月考虑了利用放射性废料封锁朝鲜的可能性,但他从未将此事提交给参谋长联席会议主席。 麦克阿瑟被解雇后,参议员阿尔伯特·戈尔(Albert Gore Sr.)也向杜鲁门提出了类似的建议。[96] 1951年1月,麦克阿瑟拒绝接受关于向前部署核武器的提议。[97] 6park.com

这里我只引两篇参考文献,因为题目就涉及在朝鲜战争使用原子弹。 6park.com

Anders, Roger M. (January 1988). "The Atomic Bomb and the Korean War: Gordon Dean and the Issue of Civilian Control". Military Affairs. Lexington, Virginia: Society for Military History. 52 (1): 1–6. doi:10.2307/1988372. JSTOR 1988372. 6park.com

Dingman, Roger (Winter 1988–1989). "Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War". International Security. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 13 (3): 50–91. doi:10.2307/2538736. JSTOR 2538736. S2CID 154823668. 6park.com

最后说点自己的看法:朝鲜战争时只有美国拥有原子弹的实战使用经验,拥有的原子弹数量也最多,放在那儿不说话对对手都是一种威胁。就像两人赤手空拳打架,一人腰上却别着一支枪,如果您是他的对手,你还需要什么语言煽动去相信他会随时拔枪射击吗?何况美国当时可是虚虚实实做足了姿态。 能说出这种话来真不知该如何理解😀

6park.com

贴主:mingxiaot于2021_04_06 22:08:43编辑
贴主:mingxiaot于2021_04_06 22:11:55编辑

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