岛兄发了个帖：韩战：南北分界线因何未能恢复三八线？
俺跟了几句，没想到很为岛兄不屑：“你真可笑！ 鹦鹉学舌前也得掂量吧：北朝鲜是美国领土？你还是写你的那小说吧，半真半假的没人跟你计较，对真实历史的了解你差得太远太远。。。” 6park.com
惭愧之余，自己上网去查了点资料，网址如下：https://www.britannica.com/event/Korean-War/To-the-negotiating-table 
坦白说，俺的英语很臭，只能靠“股沟”翻译，反正论坛里英语好的网友很多，他们可以随时矫正。俺们只要看个大概齐，看看岛兄的专业水平达到几级就行了。😀😀
文中红字（对不起，俺只标了中文，英文看不懂）是俺感觉的重点，绿字是俺的批注，绝对没有暗示谁戴绿帽子的意思啊。敬请岛兄看完后发表点评论，狠批作者观点，俺保证向欧洲（Ohio）大学推荐岛兄，取代了丫的教授职位。

Korean War 6park.com
1950–1953 6park.com
WRITTEN BY 6park.com
Allan R. Millett 6park.com
Allan R.
Millett, Ph.D., served 37 years as a history professor at The Ohio State
University (1969-2005), Allan R. Millett came to the University of New Orleans
in January 2006 to be the Ambrose Professor... 6park.com
  6park.com
To the negotiating table 6park.com
By June 1951 the Korean War had
reached another critical
point. The Chinese–North Korean armies, despite having suffered some
500,000 casualties since November, had grown to 1,200,000 soldiers. United
Nations Command had taken its share of casualties—more than 100,000 since the
Chinese intervention—but by May 1951 U.S. ground troops numbered 256,000, the
ROKA 500,000, and other allied contingents
28,000. The U.S. FEAF had grown from fewer than 700 aircraft in July 1950 to
more than 1,400 in February 1951. 6park.com
These developments obliged the leaders of both coalitions to consider that peace could not be imposed by either side through military victory—at least at acceptable cost. Truman and the UN, in particular, had lost their ardour for anything more than a return to status quo ante bellum and were sympathetic to the idea of a negotiated settlement. On May 17, 1951, the U.S. National Security Council adopted a new policy that committed the United States to support a unified, democratic Korea, but not necessarily one unified by military action and the overthrow of Kim Il-sung. The communist road to a negotiated peace started in Beijing, where Mao, who had no desire to end the war, approved an approach suggested by Peng and others: hold the ground in Korea and conduct a campaign of attrition, attempting to win limited victories against small allied units through violent night attacks and infantry infiltration. Protection from UNC aircraft and artillery would be provided by caves and bunkers dug into the Korean mountains. Meanwhile, negotiations would be managed by the Chinese, an unparalleled chance to appear an equal of the United States in Asia and a slap at the hated Japanese. The Koreans were not a factor for either side. After secret meetings between U.S. and Soviet diplomats, the Soviet Union announced that it would not block a negotiated settlement to the Korean War. The Truman administration had already alerted Ridgway to the prospect of truce talks, and on June 30 he issued a public statement that he had been authorized to participate in “a meeting to discuss an armistice providing for the cessation of hostilities.” On July 2 the Chinese and North Koreans issued a joint statement that they would discuss arrangements for a meeting, but only at their place of choice: the city of Kaesŏng, an ancient Korean capital, once part of the ROK but now occupied by the communists at the very edge of the front lines. The Chinese had just fired the first salvo of a new war, one in which talking and fighting for advantage might someday end the conflict.  6park.com
到谈判桌 6park.com
到1951年6月，朝鲜战争达到了另一个临界点。尽管自11月以来遭受了约50万人的伤亡，但中朝军队却成长为120万士兵。联合国军司令部已经承担了一定的人员伤亡份额（自中国干预以来已有10万以上的伤亡人数），但到1951年5月，美国地面部队人数已达到25.6万，大韩民国50万，其他盟军有28000。美国FEAF已从1950年7月的不足700架飞机发展到1951年2月的1,400架以上。 这些事态发展迫使两个联盟的领导人都认为，至少通过可接受的代价，双方都无法通过军事胜利强加和平 （注意是双方，而非单方感觉无法通过军事手段赢得胜利）。杜鲁门和联合国特别是失去了热情，除了恢复原状之后，对谈判达成和解的想法表示同情。 1951年5月17日，美国国家安全委员会通过了一项新政策，使美国承诺支持一个统一的民主朝鲜，但不一定要通过军事行动和推翻金日成实现统一（美国首先放弃统一朝鲜的要求）。
 通往和平谈判的共产主义道路始于北京，在那儿，不愿结束战争的毛泽东批准了彭等人提出的方法：在韩国站稳脚跟，进行消耗战，试图赢得有限的胜利小型联军经过猛烈的夜间袭击和步兵渗透。挖入朝鲜山区的山洞和掩体将提供对联合国军用飞机和大炮的保护（实际毛最初只是把谈判当做争取时间一个手段，连这都不清楚，遑论自称专家？）。同时，谈判将由中国人来管理，这是在亚洲出现与美国相当的无与伦比的机会，以及对讨厌的日本人的一记耳光。朝鲜人都不是任何一方的因素。 6park.com
 经过美国和苏联外交官的秘密会晤后，苏联宣布将不阻止通过谈判解决朝鲜战争。杜鲁门政府已经向里奇韦发出了休战谈判前景的警告，并于6月30日发表公开声明，说他已被授权参加“讨论停战以停止敌对行动的会议”。 7月2日，中国人和朝鲜人发表联合声明，表示他们将讨论会议的安排 （注意，6月30日和七月2日两个日期， 实际在二次战役后印度提出过一次和谈，美国同意，但被中朝方拒绝。中朝被迫提出谈判的说法没有事实基础），但仅限于他们选择的地点：古老的朝鲜首都开城市，曾经是韩国的一部分，但现在由共产党占领在前线的最边缘。中国人刚刚发动了一场新战争的第一枪，在这场战争中，为有利于进行对话和争取战争有一天可能会结束冲突。  6park.com
Talking and fighting, 1951–53 6park.com
Battling for position
 6park.com
From the time the liaison officers
of both coalitions met on July 8, 1951, until the armistice agreement
was signed on July 27, 1953, the Korean War continued as a “stalemate.” This
characterization is appropriate in only two ways: (1) both sides had given up
trying to unify Korea by force; and (2) the movement of armies on the ground
never again matched the fluidity of the war’s first year. Otherwise,
the word stalemate has no meaning, for the political-geographic stakes
in Korea remained high. 6park.com
As the negotiations at Kaesŏng developed, neither Ridgway nor Van Fleet believed that the talks would produce anything without more UNC offensives beyond the 38th parallel. Ridgway was particularly convinced that UNC forces should take the “Iron Triangle,” a key area between the headwaters of the Imjin River and the highest eastern mountain ranges that was anchored on the cities of Ch’ŏrwŏn (west), P’yŏnggang (north), and Kimhwa (east). Communist planners were equally convinced that control of this terrain offered advantages for defending North Korea or for continuing the war with offensives to the south and east. Ground actions never actually ceased in 1951, but none matched the ferocity and frustration of the Eighth Army’s Autumn Offensive (August 31–November 12). Van Fleet’s general concept envisioned operations by the I Corps (five divisions) in the west and the X Corps (five divisions) in the central-eastern sector. In the I Corps sector, the ROK 1st Division and the British Commonwealth Division made notable advances beyond the Imjin valley, while other U.S. and ROK divisions advanced past Ch’ŏrwŏn and then stalled in heavy fighting. The X Corps, fighting a crack Chinese army and two North Korean corps, pushed northward through the mountains and succeeded only in making “Bloody Ridge,” “Heartbreak Ridge,” “The Punchbowl,” and Kanmubong Ridge bad memories for thousands of army and marine veterans. The KPA I, III, and VI Corps, holding the eastern mountains, proved especially difficult to dislodge, for Kim Il-sung had issued a “stand or die” order to his much-enlarged and improved armed forces. The most surprising advance occurred in the X Corps sector, where two U.S. and two ROK divisions pushed the Chinese back 15 km (almost 10 miles) from Kimhwa to Kŭmsong, pushing the front line out in a salient that exposed their flanks but also establishing a strong position to advance west to P’yŏnggang. The cost of the campaign troubled Van Fleet and Ridgway: 60,000 casualties, 22,000 of them American.  6park.com
The campaign did not discourage the Chinese
leadership, since in their eyes the strategy of “active defense” had worked.
The UNC gave up major offensive operations in November, and the Chinese
actually struck back in places with some success. Communist losses of some
100,000–150,000 were significant but not crippling—certainly not enough to
drive the Chinese to end the war, only to talk some more about it. 6park.com
In late October 1951 the communists agreed to move the
truce negotiations to a more secure area, a village named P’anmunjŏm. Within two
months they accepted the current line of contact between the armies as the
military demarcation line; they also accepted related measures for the creation
of a demilitarized
zone (DMZ). The UNC accepted that there would be no verification activities
outside of the DMZ, and both sides agreed to work on a regime for enforcement
of the armistice after the shooting stopped. Much work on these items remained to
be done, but the outline of an agreement was becoming apparent as the year
ended—with one major exception: the handling of prisoners of war. 6park.com
会谈与打架，1951-53年 6park.com
争夺位置 6park.com
从两个联盟的联络官于1951年7月8日开会直到1953年7月27日签署停战协定，朝鲜战争一直是“僵局”。这种特征仅在两个方面是适当的：（1）双方都放弃了以武力统一朝鲜的企图； （2）陆军的移动再也无法与战争第一年的动荡相提并论。否则，僵局一词就没有意义，因为韩国的政治地理风险仍然很高。 6park.com
随着Kaesŏng谈判的发展，Ridgway和Van Fleet都认为，如果没有第38平行线以外的更多UNC攻势，这些对话将不会产生任何效果。里奇韦特别坚信，UNC部队应采用“铁三角”，这是临津河上游源头和东部最高山脉之间的关键区域，该山脉锚定在Ch'rwŏn（西部），P'yŏnggang（北部）城市之间）和Kimhwa（东部）。共产主义策划者同样坚信，控制这一地形可以为保卫朝鲜或继续向南方和东方发动进攻提供优势。 6park.com
  6park.com
地面行动实际上从未在1951年停止过，但没有任何行动能与第八军的秋季进攻组织（8月31日至11月12日）的凶猛和挫败相提并论。范·弗利特（Van
Fleet）的总体构想是由西部的I军（五个师）和中东部的X军（五个师）进行作战。在第1军部门中，韩国第一师和英联邦师在Imjin山谷以外取得了显着进展，而其他美国和韩国师则越过了Chrŏwŏn，然后在激烈的战斗中陷入僵局。
X军与一支精锐的中国军队和两个北朝鲜军作战，向北穿过山脉，仅成功地使“血腥岭”，“伤心岭”，“冲锋队”和坎孟邦岭给成千上万的军队和人们留下了美好的回忆。海洋退伍军人。拥有东部山区的KPA
I，III和VI军被证明特别难以撤离，因为金日成已向其规模扩大和改进后的武装部队下达了“
stand命”命令。最令人惊讶的进步发生在X军团部门，那里有两个美国和两个韩国师将中国人从金华推向甘肃省15公里（近10英里），将前线推开，突显了他们的侧翼，但也建立了一支向西前进到平壤的强大位置。竞选费用使范弗利特（Van
Fleet）和里奇韦（Ridgway）陷入困境：6万伤亡，其中22,000人是美国人。 6park.com
  6park.com
竞选活动并没有阻止中国领导人，因为在他们看来，“主动防御”策略行之有效。联合国军司令部在11月放弃了主要的进攻行动，而中国人实际上在某些地方取得了成功，反击了。共产主义者损失了大约10万至15万，这是巨大的，但并不足以使之残废—当然，这不足以驱使中国人结束战争，而只是多谈一点。 6park.com
1951年10月下旬，共产党人同意将停火谈判移至一个更安全的地区，即一个名为P'anmunjŏm的村庄。在两个月内，他们接受了军队之间目前的接触线作为军事分界线；他们还接受了建立非军事区（DMZ）的相关措施。联合国军司令部承认，在非军事区之外将不会进行任何核查活动，双方同意在枪击事件停止后制定一种执行停战协定的制度。关于这些项目的许多工作仍有待完成，但随着年底的到来，协议的大纲变得显而易见了，但有一个主要例外：处理战俘。 6park.com
。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 6park.com
The final push 6park.com
From
September to November 1952, the Chinese expeditionary force staged its sixth
major offensive of the war, this time to force the allies back to the 38th
parallel and to inflict unacceptable casualties on them. Raging
from the valley of the Imjin through the Iron Triangle to the eastern mountains,
the ground war followed the same dismal pattern. The Chinese infiltrated allied
outposts at night, then attacked under the support of short, intense artillery barrages. Submachine guns and hand grenades
ruled the trenches, and flamethrowers and demolitions became standard weapons
for assault units. Obscure hills acquired memorable names: White Horse
Mountain, Bunker Hill, Old Baldy, Sniper Ridge, Capitol Hill, Triangle Hill,
Pike’s Peak, Jackson Heights, and Jane Russell Hill. By the time fighting
faded in mid-November, the Eighth Army had lost 10,000 men, the Chinese 15,000.
Chinese commanders hoped that they had persuaded president-elect Eisenhower to
abandon any ambitious plans for a major offensive in 1953. 6park.com
The Chinese need not have worried, for both Eisenhower and
secretary of state-designate Dulles viewed continuation of the Korean War as
incompatible with U.S. national security interests. In their view the People’s Republic of China was
indeed the enemy in Asia, but Korea was only one theatre in the struggle. They
also knew that the voting public’s support for the war had thinned throughout
1952 as the talking and fighting continued abroad and the talking and taxing
continued at home. As for the negotiations, Dulles conceded the communists’
point that voluntary repatriation should involve screening by an international
agency, not just U.S.-ROK teams. When the UN and the International
Committee of the Red Cross called for an exchange of sick and
disabled POWs as a goodwill gesture, Eisenhower approved. 6park.com
The plan proved a good test of communist intentions—by sheer
chance. On March 5, 1953, Joseph Stalin died,
and within weeks the Politburo of
the Soviet Communist
Party voted that the war in Korea should be ended. Mao Zedong received
the news with dismay, but he knew that his army could not continue the war
without Soviet assistance. With a speed that amazed the negotiating teams on
both sides, the Chinese accepted voluntary repatriation. POWs who wanted to
return to their homelands would be released immediately, and those who chose to
stay would go into the custody of a neutral international agency for
noncoercive screening. The Chinese and North Koreans also agreed to the
exchange of sick and disabled POWs, which took place between April 20 and May
3. 6park.com
Peace was not
yet at hand, however. Rhee had never publicly surrendered his “march north and
unify” position, and in private he hinted that he might “accept” an armistice only in
return for serious commitments by the United States, including
an unambiguous mutual security alliance and $1 billion in economic aid. The
Chinese, meanwhile, saw but one way to win concessions and territory in a peace
agreement: on the battlefield. Their seventh and final offensive opened in the
Imjin River sector in May against U.S. and Commonwealth divisions, then shifted
to the South Koreans, who were driven back 30 km (about 19 miles) from the
Kŭmsong salient. 6park.com
最后一推 6park.com
从1952年9月至1952年11月，中国远征军发动了第六次大规模进攻，这次是迫使盟国回到第38平行线并给他们造成无法接受的伤亡。从Imjin山谷经过铁三角山脉猛烈冲向东部山区，地面战争遵循了同样惨淡的格局。中国人在晚上渗透了盟军的哨所，然后在短暂的密集炮弹的支援下发动了进攻。冲锋枪和手榴弹统治了战es，投掷者和拆除成为了突击部队的标准武器。朦胧的山丘获得了令人难忘的名字：白马山，邦克山，老秃子，狙击岭，国会山，三角山，派克峰，杰克逊高地和简·罗素山。到11月中旬战斗逐渐消退时，第八军已经失去了10,000名士兵，其中15,000名中国人丧生。中国指挥官希望他们说服艾森豪威尔总统放弃任何雄心勃勃的计划，以打击1953年的重大攻势。 6park.com
中国人不必担心，因为艾森豪威尔和国务卿杜勒斯都认为朝鲜战争的继续与美国的国家安全利益不符。他们认为，中华人民共和国确实是亚洲的敌人，但韩国只是这场斗争中的一个战场。他们还知道，由于在国外继续进行对话和战斗，而在国内继续进行对话和征税，因此有投票权的公众对战争的支持在整个1952年都已减少。至于谈判，杜勒斯承认共产党人的观点，即自愿遣返应包括国际机构的筛选，而不仅仅是美韩团队（难道不是美国在谈判中的让步？）。艾森豪威尔批准了联合国和红十字国际委员会的呼吁，将生病和残疾的战俘交换为善意。 6park.com
这个计划证明了对共产主义意图的很好考验，这是偶然的机会。 1953年3月5日，约瑟夫·斯大林（Joseph Stalin）逝世，苏联共产党政治局在几周内投票决定，应结束朝鲜战争。毛泽东很沮丧地收到了这个消息，但是他知道，如果没有苏联的协助，他的军队就无法继续战争。中国人以惊人的速度震惊了双方的谈判小组，接受了自愿遣返。想要返回家园的战俘将立即释放，而选择留下的战俘将被一个中立的国际机构进行非强制性筛查。中国和朝鲜人还同意在4月20日至5月3日之间交换病假和伤残战俘。 6park.com
但是，和平尚未到来。 Rhee从未公开放弃过他的“北进统一”立场，他私下暗示他可能会“接受”停战协定，只是作为对美国的认真承诺的回报，包括明确的相互安全联盟和10亿美元的经济援助。同时，中国人只是在和平协议中赢得让步和领土的一种途径：在战场上。他们的第七次也是最后一次进攻于5月在Imjin河地区对美国和英联邦的师发动，然后转移到韩国人，后者被驱离离Kŭmsong突出地30公里（约19英里）。（岛兄似乎很少提及此事） 6park.com
Armistice 6park.com
The battle of the Kŭmsong salient ended the shooting war. On May 25 the P’anmunjŏm negotiators
had worked out the details of the POW exchange,
making provisions for “neutral nation” management of the repatriation process.
They began to plan for an armistice signing. Then, on June 18–19, Syngman Rhee arranged
for his military police to
allow 27,000 Korean internees in their custody to “escape.” Enraged, the Chinese
ordered further attacks on the ROKA. The Americans shared their fury but, in
the interest of compromise, convinced Rhee that the United States would
meet all his preconditions for an armistice. On July 9 Rhee agreed to accept
the armistice, though no representative of the ROK ever signed it. On July
27 Mark W. Clark for
the UNC, Peng Dehuai for
the Chinese, and Kim Il-sung for
the North Koreans signed the agreement. That same day the shooting stopped
(more or less), and the armies began the awkward process of disengagement
across what became a 4-km- (2.5-mile-) wide DMZ. 6park.com
Supervision of the armistice actions fell to a Military
Armistice Commission (10 officers representing the belligerents), a Neutral
Nations Supervisory Commission (Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia), and a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (the same four
states, plus India as
the custodian of the POWs). From August 5 to September 6, a total of 75,823
communist soldiers and civilians (all but 5,640 of them Koreans) returned to
their most-favoured regime, and 7,862 ROK soldiers, 3,597 U.S. servicemen, and
1,377 persons of other nationalities (including some civilians) returned to UNC
control. The swap became a media event of potent possibilities: the communist
POWs stripped off their hated capitalist prison uniforms and marched off
singing party-approved songs. 6park.com
The handling of those who refused repatriation turned into a
nightmare, as agents among the communist POWs and interrogators made life
miserable for the Indians. By the time the Neutral Nations Repatriation
Commission gave up the screening process in February 1954, only 628 Chinese and
Koreans had changed their minds and gone north, and 21,839 had returned to UNC
control. Most of the nonrepatriates were eventually settled in South Korea and Taiwan. 6park.com
As provided
for in the armistice agreement, the United States organized an international
conference in Geneva for all the belligerents to discuss the political
future of Korea. The actual meetings produced no agreement. The Korean
peninsula would continue to be caught in the coils of Cold War rivalry, but
the survival of the Republic of Korea kept alive the hope of civil liberties, democracy, economic development, and eventual
unification—even if their fulfillment might require another 50 years or more. 6park.com
Allan R. Millett 6park.com
停战 6park.com
奎松显着的战斗结束了射击战争。 5月25日，P'anmunjŏm谈判人员制定了战俘交换的细节，为遣返过程的“中立国”管理做出了规定。他们开始计划停战协议。然后，在6月18日至19日，李承晚安排他的宪兵让27,000名在押的韩国被拘留者“逃脱”。激怒了，中国人下令对韩国国防军进行进一步的攻击。美国人同情他们的愤怒，但出于妥协的考虑，他使Rhee确信美国将满足他停战的所有先决条件。 7月9日，李承晚同意接受停战协定，尽管韩国代表从未签署过停战协定（美国甚至迫使盟友让步的神操作）。
7月27日，马克·克拉克（Mark
W. Clark）代表UNC，彭德怀（Peng
Dehuai）代表中国，金日成（Kim
Il-sung）代表朝鲜签署了协议。同一天，射击停止了（或多或少），军队开始了尴尬的脱离接触的过程，越过了4公里（2.5英里）宽的DMZ。 6park.com
停战行动的监督工作由军事停战委员会（代表交战方的10名官员），中立国家监督委员会（瑞典，瑞士，波兰和捷克斯洛伐克）和中立国家遣返委员会（相同的四个州，加上印度战俘的保管人）。从8月5日至9月6日，共有75,823名共产主义士兵和平民（其中除5,640人以外的所有朝鲜人）返回了他们最青睐的政权，还有7,862名韩国士兵，3,597名美国军人和1,377名其他国籍的人（包括一些平民） ）返回到UNC控制。互换成为媒体上潜在可能性的事件：共产党战俘剥夺了仇恨的资本主义监狱服，并游行通过了经党派批准的歌曲。 6park.com
对那些拒绝遣返者的处理变成了一场噩梦，因为共产党战俘和审讯者中的特工使印第安人的生活痛苦不堪。到1954年2月，中立国遣返委员会放弃甄别程序时，只有628名中国人和朝鲜人改变了主意，向北走，而21,839人又回到了联合国军控制下。大多数非遣返者最终定居在韩国和台湾。 6park.com
按照停战协定的规定，美国在日内瓦为所有交战国组织了一次国际会议，讨论朝鲜的政治前途。实际会议没有达成协议。朝鲜半岛将继续陷入冷战的盘旋之中，但大韩民国的生存仍然充满着公民自由，民主，经济发展和最终统一的希望，即使要实现这一目标可能还需要50年的时间。或者更多。 6park.com
艾伦·米利特 6park.com
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贴主:mingxiaot于2021_04_17 13:25:49编辑 6park.com
贴主:mingxiaot于2021_04_17 13:26:06编辑
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 6park.com
贴主:mingxiaot于2021_04_17 13:42:28编辑

贴主:mingxiaot于2021_04_17 13:47:43编辑