Although the 9th Army was one of China's elite formations, composed of veterans and former POWs from the Huaihai Campaign,[45] several deficiencies hampered its ability during the battle. Initially the 9th Army was intended to be outfitted in Manchuria during November, but Mao suddenly ordered it into Korea before that could happen.[57] As a result, the 9th Army had almost no winter clothing for the harsh Korean winter.[58] Similarly, poor logistics forced the 9th Army to abandon heavy artillery,[3][59] while working with little food and ammunition.[58] The food shortage forced the 9th Army to initially station a third of its strength away from the Chosin Reservoir in reserve,[60] and starvation and exposure broke out among the Chinese units, since foraging was not an option in the sparsely populated area.[58] By the end of the battle, more Chinese troops had died from the cold than from combat and air raids.[61]